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The Slippery Path 
to Productivity 
Improvement 
TAREK . ABDEL-HAMID, Naval Postgraduate School 
ince the 1970s, software producing organizations 
have invested in dozens of technological innova- 
tions such as fourth-generation languages, CASE 
products, object-oriented analysis and program- 
ming, and software reuse-all of which are intend- S ed to boost software development productivity. 
Spending on application development tools has been conserva- 
tively estimated to be growing at 19 percent annually,’ making it 
one of the hottest segments of the computer industry. 
Yet to the disillusionment of both software project managers 
as well as business executives, productivity in software develop- 
ment has lagged behind that of more mature disciplines. 
Adjusted for inflation, the value added per worker has been a t  
$40,000 for two decades, and we are not seeing any increases.’ 
Stagnating productivity is often to blame for spiraling software 
costs, excessive time to market, and friction with users. No won- 
der, then, in an era of increasing consolidation and downsizing, 
the issue of software productivity is rising to near the top of the 
senior software development manager’s worry list.3 
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The oldest conventional explanation 
blames this stagnation on poor manage- 
ment execution. In this article, I attempt 
to demonstrate that there may be more 
systemic, albeit counterinhiitive, causes 
for the “productivity paradox.” 
Specifically, the productivity potential 
of software engineering tools may be 
squandered not because organizations 
fail to institute the necessary managerial 
practices but  because the software 
development environment is a complex 
social system that causes such practices 
to have unintended consequences. 
T o  support this view, I used a sys- 
tem dynamics micvowosld of the soft- 
ware development process to simulate 
the long-term productivity trend in a 
hypothetical project environment man- 
aged “by-the-book.” T h e  microworld 
lets the project team examine possible 
causes one by one through controlled 
experimentation and hence allows 
them to discern true causal relation- 
ships in a failed project. T h e  results 
indicate productivity erosion was unin- 
tentionally accelerated by perfectly 
“good” planning and control practices. 
T 
A review of the literature suggests 
that thousands of medium and large 
enterprises are turning to CASE prod- 
ucts on the intuition that this is the 
way to go for realizing improvements 
in productivity. Annual expenditures 
on CASE are reported to  be in the 
neighborhood of $100 million and 
rapidly rising.’ 
At first glance, the  picture  of 
CASE’S contribution to productivity 
seems mixed. On the one hand, the lit- 
erature  abounds with extravagant 
claims for the productivity-enhancing 
potential of CASE. On the other, there 
are many reports of major disappoint- 
ments and failures. 
A closer look, however, reveals an 
interesting dichotomy. Studies con- 
ducted in laboratory settings using rel- 
atively small pilot projects tend to  
rep or  t pro ducti vi ty 
improvements of 100 to 600 percent.4 
O n  the other hand, when the produc- 
tivity impact of CASE is assessed in 
real organizational settings, we find 
much more modest productivity gaiqs 
(15 to 30 percent) or none at all.’ 
It is tempting to view the laboratory 
study results as eT1dence for the produc- 
tivity potent ial  of CASE technology 
(under optimal conditions), and 
attribute the shortfall in real organiza- 
tional settings to poor management exe- 
cution. -As Watts Humphrey observed, 
“three quarters of the organizations 
we’ve seen haven’t instituted the kinds 
of rudimentary management practices 
needed before tooling up. T h e y  are 
looking for a solution they can buy.”6 
However, my research and that of 
others in system dynamics suggests 
that the reasons for the productivity 
paradox have more to  do with the 
complexity of social systems than with 
our failure to execute good manage- 
ment practices. 
impress i v e 
Research in the last few- decades 
reveals that social systems belong to 
the class of mzikiloop zonliizear feedback 
g~istems-the same class of systems that 
contains our most complex technologi- 
cal systems, including chemical refiner- 
ies, communication networks, and 
autopilots. Engineers have long appre- 
ciated that the complex feedback struc- 
ture of such systems is often a source of 
puzzling behavior and that intuitive 
judgment alone is unreliable in esti- 
mating how these systems will change 
with time, even with good knowledge 
of the individual parts of the system. 
Hence, in designing engineering sys- 
tems,  developers rout inely use 
advanced methods of dynamic analysis 
and computer modeling to anticipate 
system behavior. 
By contrast, in designing and man- 
aging social systems, managers and 
politicians continue to rely on intu- 
ition, contemplation, and debate with- 
out any dynamic analysis adequate to 
prevent unexpected consequences. No 
wonder social systems seem diabolical, 
because “doing the  obvious th ing  
(quite often) does not  produce the 
obvious desired outcome.”’ W e  see 
this in the many government programs 
that led to ineffective results, or worse, 
to the opposite of what was intended. 
VEL0 T 
Over the last three decades, the 
work of Jay Forrester’ and others in 
system dynamics have demonstrated 
both the feasibility and utility of con- 
structing computer-based microworlds 
to  s tudy complex social systems. 
Analogous to  the aeronautical engi- 
neer’s aircraft model in a wind tunnel 
and the naval designer’s model ship in 
a wave tank, a system dynamics 
microworld is a computer-based repli- 
ca of organizational reality. Using 
these tools, managers, like engineers, 
can have a laboratory in which they can 
simulate system behavior, and conduct 
laboratory experiments before actually 
implementing new programs. 
More recently, I have successfully 
applied the technology to the software 
project  domain by creat ing a 
microworld of software development 
activities at the project level. A soft- 
ware development  microworld is 
extremely valuable because it is either 
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not  practical o r  costs too much to  
replicate project experiences. When 
experimentation with a real system is 
in fe as i b 1 e, si mu1 a ti on  becomes the 
main-in some cases only-way to  
study how complex systems work. 
I developed the microworld on the 
basis of interviews with software project 
managers in five organizations- 
General Motors, Digital Equipment 
Corp., Softech, M I T  Computer Center, 
and MITRE-and an extensive database 
of empirical findings from the literature. 
Our goal was to capture the policies and 
procedures, both tangible and intangi- 
ble, that dominate decision making in 
software projects. I also conducted sev- 
eral tests to validate the model.9 
The box on page 45 gives an overview 
of the microworld five subsystems. 
Productivity structure. Figure 1 shows 
the microworld’s productivity struc- 
ture, which is part of the production 
subsystem described in the box on page 
45 and shown in Figure A. T h e  
microworld integrates the multiple 
functions of the software development 
process, including management func- 
tions (planning, control, and staffing) 
and software production activities 
(design, code, review, and test). T h e  
productivity structure is based, in part, 
on Ivan Steiner’s model of group pro- 
ductivity,” which states that 
Prodzictivity = potential pToductiwity - 
losses due to faulty processes 
where “potential productivity” is the 
level of productivity attained when an 
individual or group makes the best pos- 
sible use of their available resources. It is 
a function of the nature of the task (pro- 
ject type, product complexity, program- 
ming language) and the team’s resources 
(software tools, hardware facilities). The 
team’s “average nominal potential pro- 
ductivity” is the weighted average of two 
nominal potential productivities, one for 
experienced staff and one for newly 
acquired staff. T h e  average nominal 
potential productivity thus changes 
throughout the project’s life cycle as the 
experience mix changes. T h e  
microworld also captures the effects of 
learning. As work progresses, die team 
becomes better acquainted with the task, 
and productivity increases. 
Actual productivity rarely equals poteii- 
tial productivity because of “losses due to 
faulty processes.” In the microworld, the 
losses are a multiplier that effectively 
decreases the average productive fraction 
of a person-day. For example, if the avet- 
age losses amount to a four person-hout 
loss, and the nominal person-day for a ful- 
drne employee is eight hours, the value of 
the mdtiplier is 0.5. 
Eroding factors. The “faulty processes” 
referred to in the productivity equation 
are typically due to dynamic motivation 
factors and communication overhead. 
LMany motivations, such as the possibility 
for growth and advancement, the level of 
responsibility, and salary, are not dynam- 
ic; that is, they are a fixed part of an orga- 
nization’s overall software development 
environment. As such, we assume they 
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remain constant during the project’s life 
and implicitly incorporate them in the 
definition of potential productivity. An 
example of a dynamic motivation factor 
is schedule pressure.” Schedule pressures 
can be quite significant, pushing the 
“actual fraction of a person-day” up if the 
pressure is positive or down if the pres- 
sure is negative. Thus, when project 
members perceive that a project is 
behind schedule, they inay be willing to 
work harder (though not indefinitely) to 
bring it back on schedule. On the other 
hand, when they perceive some excesses 
in the schedule or budget, project mem- 
bers tend to absorb parts of these excess- 
es by goldplating and/or underwork. 
Again, there are limits on how much 
such members would be willing, o r  
allowed, to absorb. Beyond these limits, 
excesses are typically translated into cuts 
in the project’s schedule or budget. 
Additional losses to productivity are 
incurred from communication overhead. 
When a team develops software, each 
individual must spend part of the time 
communicating with other team mem- 
bers to share experiences, explain deci- 
sions, answer questions about design, and 
so 011. Although this communication is 
essential to the success of the project, 
each communication path created trans- 
lates into additioiial effort and therefore 
time.” In the microworld, such commw 
nication overhead represents the loss in 
one person’s nominal productivity. 
SIMULATION EXPERIMENT 
To study the productivity paradox, I 
conducted a simulation using a 
microworld of a project environment 
managed “by the book.” I was able to 
see the environment’s long-term pro- 
ductivity trend and discovered that 
perfectly reasonable management prac- 
tices may actually (unintentionally) 
contribute to a decline in or stagnatlon 
of productivity. 
Project Cycle 
Project KDSI 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Undersizing % 
1 40 40 10 s 0 30 2 0 40 
- i 0 20 40 10 .5 0 30 20 
3 hO 30 2 0 40 10 su 30 
4 70  .i 0 3 0 2 0  40 1 0 S 0 
S 80 10 5 0 3 0 2 0  40 10 
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dation is MBTE, a hypothetical man- 
agement-by-the-book organization 
involved in the development of tnedi- 
um-sized software projects. MBTB’s 
software development group is large 
enough to handle five projects concur- 
rently. T o  control for the effect of pro- 
ject  variations on productivity,  I 
assumed that the group works on a 
fixed bundle of five projects. After the 
five projects are completed (at different 
times), the group starts a new set of 
five identical projects. Project sizes are 
40,000, 50,000, 60,000, 70,000, aiid 
80,000 delivered source instructions. I 
simulated six project cycles spanning 
approximately 10 years. 
Because undersizing continues to be 
a pervasive problem in the software 
industry, I randomly assigned under- 
sizing levels of from 10 to 50 percent 
to the projects. For cycle 1, I used a 
table of random numbers. For cycles 2 
through 6, I allocated undersizing lev- 
els according to  the Lat in  square 
design in Table I .  
As a management-by-the-book orga- 
nization, MBTB is continuously 
upgrading its software engineering 
tools. Furthermore, a metrics group 
conducts laboratory studies at the end 
of every project cycle to quantitatively 
assess the effect of adopted tools on staff 
productivity. Table 2 shows the metrics 
group’s results, which predict that indi- 
cent over the six cycles (1 0 years). 
T o  simulate these potential produc- 
tivity improvernents, I increased the 
model’s nominal potential productivity 
parameters at the end of each cycle. 
That is, the nominal potential produc- 
tivity parameters at the beginning of 
cycle 6 are 1.5 times those of cycle 1. 
Figure 2 shows the procedure 
MBTE uses to measure project produc- 
tivity and calibrate estimates of future 
productivity. When  a project team 
completes a project, they add project 
statistics (project size, total effort, cotn- 
pletion time) to an organizational data- 
base of historical project statistics. The 
organization then uses these statistics 
periodically to recalibrate their estima- 
tion tools, which in turn are used to 
estimate future projects. 
For project planning and control, 
MBTB uses Barry Boehm’s Cocorno esti- 
mation model.” T o  reflect MBTB’s con- 
tinuously evolving software development 
environment, the actual effort and dura- 
tion values of the five completed projects 
in every project cycle are used to recali- 
brate the constant tertii in Cocomo’s 
nominal effort equation using the least- 
squares approximation technique Boehm 
recommends.” The  updated Cocoino 
model would then be applied to all pro- 
jects in the next project cycle. 
Results. Figure 3 shows the increase 
Assumptions. The subject of the sim- vidual producuvity wili increase 50 per- ’ in averagc productivity over the six 
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Figuipe 3. Improvement in average pi-odzictiviry during a simxlntion of a nuimge- 
ment-by-the-book orgaizization ’s so&aw eiiciromzeizt. The nsswzption is that the 
so$wmre development p u p  does five projects p e r  cycle. The simulntioii spaizs six cjlcles 
for a total of 10 years. 
cycles. T h e  average productivity dur- 
ing a cycle is 300 KDSI (total delivered 
source instructions of all five projects) 
divided by the total cost in person- 
months. As the figure shows, average 
productivity increased by only 29 per- 
cent over the six cycles, only slightly 
over half the SO percent predicted by 
MBTB’s metrics group. 
T o  investigate the causes of the 
shortfall, I compared the performance 
of project 5-whose true size (without 
undersizing) is 80 ICDSI-in the last 
two cycles. Figure 4 shows how the 
project’s staffing level, perceived size, 
and estimated cost changed over time. 
Note that in cycle 5, the team underes- 
timated project size by 40 percent and 
seriously understaffed the project from 
the start. As the team beg-an to see the 
true scope of the projcct a little inore 
than tnidway through, management 
reacted-or overreacted-by signifi- 
cantly increasing staff size. Such an 
overreaction, a cc o r di n g t o  Ro g e r  
Pressman, remains quite common, 
attesting to the myth that many soft- 
ware managers still believe:I2 If we fall 
behind schedule, we caiz always add more 
pyogi~amnzei~s and catch up h i t e r  iv the 
pyoject. 
Unfortunately, as Pressman notes, 
adding people late in a project is often 
disruptive. The new people must learn 
the system, and their teachers are none 
o ther  than those doing the work 
already. Thus ,  as the original staff 
stops working to train the new staff, 
the project falls further behind. Adding 
to this lag are the new communication 
paths necessary to complete the train- 
ing. S o t  only does the project not get 
caught up, but communication c o n -  
plexity increases, which further erodes 
productivity. 
T h e  experiment gave me another 
insight into the long-term effects of 
these kinds of decisions. In Figure 4b, 
the estimated productivity a t  the begin- 
ning of cycle 6 is only 5.7 percent high- 
er than that in cycle 5, and only 10 per- 
cent higher than that in cycle 1.  
Contrast these fiLpres with the expected 
gains in Table 2.  What is the cause of 
the discrepancy? My experiment 
showed that it is a direct consequence of 
the way MBTB calibrates their produc- 
tivity estimates. The measurement and 
calibration process in Figure 2 relies on 
mw project results to calibrate future 
estimates. By using inefficient perfor- 
mance results such as those from cycle 
5, MBTB’s management, in effect, cod- 
ifies past project’s inefficiencies into its 
benchmarks for future projects. 
Forecasts about physical events like 
a hurricane do not influence the reality 
of those events. By contrast, project 
estimates and expectations affect 
actions, and in turn outcomes. Low 
productivity estimates can influence 
project behavior in two ways. At the 
group level, a low productivity estimate 
can lead to the consequences of the 
catch-up myth (higher staffing + high- 
er communication and coordination 
overhead + higher cost).’ At the indi- 
vidual level, expectations can become 
self-fulfilling. According to Boehm,” if 
the expected cost for a milestone activi- 
ty is within 20 percent of the “ideal,” a 
manager can turn such expectations 
into a self-fulfilling prophecy. If the 
manager’s expectation is 20 percent 
higher than the ideal (there’s some 
“fat” in the estimate), Parkinson’s Law 
indicates that people will use the extra 
time for training, personal activities, 
catching up on mail, general profes- 
sional activities, and so on-slack cotn- 
ponents that can make up more than 20 
percent of a person’s time on the job. If 
the expectation communicated is 20 
percent under the “ideal,” the manager 
is likely to work the team a little harder. 
Thus, the actual cost of completing the 
milestone activity will be (about) equal 
to the expected cost for the activity. 
A 
As m y  simulation shows, long- 
t e rm productivity results fell way 
below expectations, and this was a 
well-managed organizatioii. In prac- 
rice, most software projects are con- 
ducted with poorly defined require- 
ments, staff turnover, volatile hard- 
ware platforms, and any number of 
other problems. If an  organization 
with such  problems relies o n  the  
textbook model of measurement and 
ca l ibra t ion  (F igu re  2 ) ,  i t  will be  
doomed  to pe rpe tua te  a cycle of 
inefficiency. T h e  simulation results 
clearly show that this model does not 
l e t  M B T B  fully exploit and  learn 
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from past project mistakes-a learn- 
ing disability that can be quite costly 
over the long run. 
W h y  doesn’t this model work? 
Quite simply it doesn’t let the team 
learn from the project experience. 
Effective project planning and control 
is a complex process that involves two 
kinds of skills: looking backward to  
understand the past and looking for- 
ward to predict the future. While many 
would like to believe that learning from 
experience is automatic, in reality inter- 
preting experience requires profound 
skills. Experience after all, provides 
only data, not knowledge. People can 
turn data into knowledge only when 
they know how to evaluate the data. 
Interpreting software planning and 
control experiences is especially prob- 
lematic because of the difficulty in 
separating the quality of estimates 
from the effects of actions based on 
those estimates. For example, are poor 
outcomes due to  poor estimation or 
poor  implementat ion o r  bo th?  
Attempting to make inferences about 
the causal relationships among esti- 
mates, actions, and outcomes cogni- 
tively is not only extremely difficult 
but also subject to a variety of psycho- 
logical factors, such as memory loss, 
information overload, and recency and 
primacy effects. Both Recency (recent 
occurrences are likely to be relatively 
easier to retrieve from memory) and 
primacy (the salience of an occur- 
rence) affect thc  ease with which 
instances can be brought to mind.’ 
T h e  software engineering micro- 
world provides a viable alternative for 
untangling these causal relationships. 
By using the microworld as a lahorato- 
ry for conducting controlled experi- 
ments on the effects of change, the 
team can observe one factor while 
keeping the others constant. This lets 
them dissect the project experience and 
discern what went wrong and why. 
To illustrate how a project team can 
learn from the microworld, I offer the 
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Figure 4. Simulation o f  pmject 5. The gi~oups o f  numben o n  the y-axis represent 
three scales. The top number i?z each g~oup denotes the scale for the total stafi the 
middle number? in each gmup demtes the scale j i r  the pi-oject size, and the bottom 
number devotes the scale for the estimated cost. (A) Uring Cocomo 5- effoi’t equation, 
we get an estimated pivductivity of 350.6 deliveqyed soune imtmctions per  p e n o n -  
month in cycle 5. Initial estinzates fo7 that eycle were 48 D S I  and a cost of 136.9 
penon-nzonths. (B) In eycle 6, the estimated productivity is 370.4 DSI per  p e ~ s o ~ z -  
month liuith initial estimates of 72 KDSI and 194.4 person-months. In cycle 1,  p m  
jec t  5 was undenized by 10 per-cent. The estimated effort was 21 4 person-months; 
the estimated pmductivity, 116 DSIper penon-month. 
Figire 5. In the normali7ation engine, 
the microworld wrings out iiiefficicncies 
from the results of completed probleni 
projects to derive normalized cost and 
productivity benchmarks for future esti- 
mation. As part of the normalization 
process, the team performs a project 
postmortem to assess dysfunctional 
practices and their impact on project 
performance. In  the simulation, the 
postmortem is limited to assessing pro- 
ductivity losses caused by the undersiz- 
inghnderstaffing problem. 
In cycle I ,  project 4 is the most 
I E E E  S O F T W A R E  





severely undersized project, so I used it 
as a subject to demonstrate this new 
strategy. Table 3 gives the base-case 
project estimates and actual results. 
T o  assess the effect of the initial 
understaffinghdersizing problem on 
the project’s final cost of 246 person- 
days, I ran a series of project simula- 
tions, setting the size to 70 KDSI (actual 
size) a t  the start. I began by setting the 
project’s initial cost estimate to 246 per- 
son-days (which I suspect is too high, 
because it reflects the very inefficiencies 
we are seeking to discard) but then grad- 
ually decreased it in subsequent runs 
until I achieved the lowest completion 
cost. Figure 6 shows the result. 
The  “optimal” cost estimate for the 
project is 204 person-months. T h e  42 
person-month difference between this 
normalized cost and the project’s base- 
case cost of 246 person-months reflects 
the  effect of inefficient staffing 
(because of undersizing). The  project’s 
normalized 204 person-month value 
would then be incorporated into the 
Figure F. Pyoposed measumnent and calzbviltzon wntegy. 112 this stmtegy, maiz- 
agers can learn thmugb iontipolled expeivneratation what went al-ong mid why. The 
nommlzzatzon pp-ootesJ w n n p  out zizefficzencies f i o m  the I-eszilts of completed problem 
organization’s normalized database to 
calibrate the Cocomo estimation tool. 
To  assess the effect of the proposed 
250 7 I 
180 
170 185 200 220 245.8 
Initial estimate of cost (person-months) 
Figure 6. Results of detei-mzning novnalzzed cost. 
normalization strategy on organization- 
al productivity, I resimulated the entire 
six-cycle MBTB scenario. I performed 
resimulations first for all five projects at 
the end of project cycle 1 to derive five 
normalized cost values, which I then 
used to update the Cocomo coefficient. 
Once I calibrated Cocomo, I resimulat- 
ed the projects in cycle 2 under the 
identical set of conditions used in the 
base case, including the  projects’ 
undersizing rates (in Table 1). (I used 
the projects’ true sizes only during nor- 
malization, which I conducted after the 
~ project cycle.) I repeated the process 
for all six project cycles. 
~ Figure 7 shows that average produc- 
~ tivity improved by 42 percent. While 
appreciably higher than the 29 percent 
gain in the base case, the productivity 
improvement is still short of the 50 
percent gain achieved in MBTB’s labo- 
ratory setting. This persistent shortfall 
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is analogous to the gap I discussed ear- 
lier between the productivity gains 
observed in laboratory settings versus 
those achieved on real projects from 
using CASE technology. The shortfall 
here is caused by the undersizing prob- 
lem that persists through cycle 6. 
n our management-by-the-book I scenario almost half the productivi- 
ty gains from new software develop- 
ment tools were squandered by a com- 
bination of good and bad management 
practices. In real life, organizations are 
much worse off. Many more things can 
go wrong, and often do. Consequently, 
nearly all potential productivity gains 
are eroded. 
I am extending work with the 
microworld to explore the truss hypotl- 
esis depicted in Figure 8. This hypothe- 
















porarily increases prociuctivity when it 
periodically migrates to new genera- 
sons of software tools. However, gains 
Figure 7. Normalized Venus base-case veims potential productivity improvement. In 
contirast to  Figu7.e 3 (based on the traditional vaeasurement and calibiration strategy), 
are completely depleted over the long- 
term in part because of the unintended 
consequences of well-intentioned man- 
agement practices. The result is produc- 
tivity stagnation over the long term. 
Software managers attempting to 
do “the right thing,” must feel that 
their efforts are meeting a resistance 
that  comes from nowhere.  I have 
attempted to show that such resistance 
is neither capricious nor mysterious. 
In fact, systems thinking calls it cow- 
pensating fiedback- a phenomenon in 
complex social systems in which an 
external intervention produces natural 
feedback effects within the system that 
counteract the intended effect of the 
intervention. l 4  
Such compensating feedback effects 
are not unique to the software environ- 
ment; they are a common and pro- 
foundly significant part of the structure 
and behavior of most complex social 
systems. Attempts to develop correc- 
tive programs without taking proper 
account of these feedback effects will 
continue to disappoint us. + 









due to inefficient 
practices 
Time 
F i p r e  8. The tmss hypothesis. The hypothesis explains why picoductivity fails t o  
increase over the long t e r n .  The organization experiences an initial incvease from the 
new technology but productivity emdes due to  ineficient practices. The result is long- 
term stagnation. 
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